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Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law 
Adam B. Cox† 
The history of immigration jurisprudence is a history of obsession 
with judicial deference. The foundational doctrine of constitutional 
immigration law—the “plenary power” doctrine—is centrally con-
cerned with such deference.
1
 Under the doctrine’s earliest incarnation, 
the Supreme Court treated a challenge to a federal immigration policy 
excluding Chinese immigrants as nearly nonjusticiable, writing that 
the federal government’s decisions about how to regulate immigration 
were “conclusive upon the judiciary.”
2
 Even in the modern constitu-
tional era, the Supreme Court has invoked the plenary power to jus-
tify watered-down review of gender classifications in the immigration 
code.
3
 And some lower courts have suggested that the plenary power 
precludes any judicial scrutiny of immigration decisions affecting ar-
riving immigrants.
4
 
This century-old doctrine has been augmented by developments 
in administrative law that often obligate judges to defer to agencies’ 
factual and legal judgments. The Chevron doctrine is perhaps the best-
known strand of these developments. Under Chevron, courts must 
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
provisions, even if the court disagrees with those interpretations.
5
 Sis-
ter doctrines in administrative law counsel courts to defer to factual 
determinations by agencies as well.
6
  
 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Many thanks to 
Ahilan Arulanantham, Alison LaCroix, Jonathan Masur, and Adam Samaha for helpful com-
ments. Thanks also to Kit Slack and Sarah Waxman for excellent research assistance. 
 1 See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 Cal L Rev 373, 381–84 
(2004). 
 2 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US 581, 606 (1889).  
 3 See, for example, Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977).  
 4 See, for example, Jean v Nelson, 727 F2d 957, 964 (11th Cir 1984) (en banc): 
[T]here are apparently no limitations on the power of the federal government to determine 
what classes of aliens will be permitted to enter the United States or what procedures will 
be used to determine their admissibility. . . . Aliens may therefore be denied admission on 
grounds that would be constitutionally impermissible or suspect in the context of domestic 
legislation. 
 5 Chevron U.S.A. Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837, 843 (1984). 
 6 See, for example, Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc v NLRB, 522 US 359, 366 (1998) 
(requiring courts to defer to agency fact findings that are supported by “substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole”). 
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Taken together, these constitutional traditions and administrative 
law trends would appear to make it inevitable that federal courts will 
passively accept administrative judgments on immigration matters.
7
 
Yet Judge Posner’s recent immigration jurisprudence flips this founda-
tional premise on its head: his immigration opinions exhibit extremely 
searching review. Rather than reflecting constitutional or administra-
tive law deference, his opinions treat immigration authorities with 
great skepticism. Moreover, Posner’s lack of deference is far from 
idiosyncratic. Today a growing number of federal judges review deci-
sions by the immigration courts with apparent skepticism.
8
 In fact, the 
trend is significant enough to count as an important—though often 
overlooked—thread of modern immigration jurisprudence. 
What might account for this unexpected skepticism? In this short 
Essay commemorating Judge Posner’s twenty-fifth year on the bench, 
I want to suggest two possibilities. The first has to do with democracy, 
and focuses on the relationship between Congress and the President 
in the immigration arena. The second has more to do with institutional 
competence, and focuses on the relationship between federal judges 
and the administrative immigration courts. Part I introduces the first 
theory, and Part II the second. 
I.  NONDELEGATION NORMS AND IMMIGRATION LAW 
In order to make sense of Judge Posner’s unusual treatment of 
immigration courts, it is helpful to start with one possible source of 
that treatment—the Constitution itself. At first glance, it might seem 
counterintuitive to look to the Constitution as a potential source of 
judicial skepticism, given what I described above as constitutional 
immigration law’s preoccupation with judicial deference in the immi-
gration arena. But this longstanding focus on the role of the judiciary 
has obscured a different separation of powers issue—a nondelegation 
concern—that might help explain Judge Posner’s skepticism. 
Constitutional immigration law has long been concerned with 
separation of powers problems. These issues are at the center of the 
immigration plenary power doctrine, which in its classic formulation 
requires that courts give great deference to political branch decisions 
about immigration policy and enforcement. Plenary power doctrine 
                                                                                                                           
 7 And, in fact, several prominent administrative deference cases decided by the Supreme 
Court have been immigration cases. See, for example, INS v Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US 415, 425 
(1999) (extending Chevron beyond the rulemaking context by holding that the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals should be accorded Chevron deference when it interprets statutory terms in the 
context of case-by-case adjudication). 
 8 See, for example, Chen v DOJ, 426 F3d 104, 115 (2d Cir 2005); Fiadjoe v Attorney General, 
411 F3d 135, 154–55 (3d Cir 2005); Lopez-Umanzor v Gonzales, 405 F3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir 2005). 
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thus focuses on the distribution of authority between the judiciary and 
the political branches of the federal government. For all this attention 
to the constitutional distribution of authority between courts and the 
political branches, however, immigration courts and commentators 
have consistently overlooked a second separation of powers issue: the 
difficult question of how immigration power is distributed within the 
political branches, between Congress and the executive generally, or 
more specifically between Congress and administrative agencies. For 
that reason, they have also failed to ask what role, if any, courts should 
play in enforcing that distribution of power. 
Constitutional immigration law provides little guidance about the 
distribution of immigration authority between Congress and the ex-
ecutive. The Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that immigra-
tion power is distributed within the political branches in the same 
fashion as most other lawmaking powers. But it is far from clear that 
immigration is like other areas. In most other areas, Article I gives 
Congress clear supremacy with respect to lawmaking. Immigration 
law, however, is nothing like this; the constitutional source of power to 
make immigration law has always been contested and uncertain. 
While Article I confers on Congress power to establish a “uniform 
rule of naturalization,”
9
 the Supreme Court has not read this provision 
as the sole source of federal authority over immigration. Instead, the 
Court has for over a century made conflicting and ambiguous pro-
nouncements about the source of federal immigration authority. 
Sometimes the Court has stated that the immigration power derives 
from an extraconstitutional source—from principles of international 
law, or from the foundational attributes of sovereignty.
10
 On other oc-
casions the Court has indicated that the immigration power is part and 
parcel of the foreign relations power.
11
 And, to round things out, the 
Court has from time to time suggested that the immigration power is 
entailed by the combination of a number of enumerated powers.
12
  
                                                                                                                           
 
 9 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4. 
 10 See, for example, Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698, 711 (1893) (“The right to 
exclude or to expel all aliens . . . [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and 
independent nation.”); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US 581, 603 (1889) (noting that the 
power to exclude aliens “is an incident of every independent nation”). 
 11 See, for example, Fong Yue Ting, 149 US at 705 (noting that “the constitution [sic] has 
committed the entire control of international relations,” which includes the power to exclude and 
expel noncitizens, to the national government); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US at 605–06 
(stating that the federal government is “invested with power over all the foreign relations of the 
country,” and therefore has the power to “preserve [the nation’s] independence, and give security 
against foreign aggression and encroachment . . . whether from the foreign nation acting in its 
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us”). 
 12 The enumerated powers suggested by the Court include the Treatymaking Clause, the 
War Powers Clauses, the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Republican Government Clause, and 
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Confusion about the source of immigration power creates sub-
stantial uncertainty about the distribution of that authority between 
Congress and the executive. Nonetheless, there are hints in the case 
law that courts are sometimes uncomfortable with the role that the 
executive branch immigration agencies play in formulating immigra-
tion policy. Article III judges, including Posner on occasion, seem to 
suggest that some of the interpretive authority claimed by the immi-
gration agencies should be reserved for Congress. Thus, I suggest that 
the surprising judicial skepticism directed at immigration courts might 
best be understood as reflecting a nondelegation norm. 
Classically, nondelegation principles in constitutional law prohibit 
Congress from delegating lawmaking power to the executive branch. 
The nondelegation doctrine is essentially a dead letter today—if any 
such general doctrine really ever existed.
13
 But nondelegation princi-
ples are still alive and well in particular contexts. As Cass Sunstein has 
pointed out, for example, courts today sometimes restrict delegation 
by refusing to apply standard deference doctrines in situations where 
there is reason to think that Congress, rather than an administrative 
agency, should be forced to make a particular policy choice.
14
 Sunstein 
identifies a number of interpretive canons—which he calls “nondele-
gation canons”—that override default delegation rules in this way. He 
argues that these canons serve as a kind of “democracy-forcing mini-
malism”: they are “designed to ensure that certain choices are made 
by an institution with a superior democratic pedigree.”
15
 The idea of 
nondelegation canons links the protection of individual rights or other 
important interests to questions of appropriate institutional design. In 
other words, the theory focuses on promoting democratic legitimacy 
or accountability by selecting the institution with the better democ-
ratic pedigree. (We might therefore contrast this strategy with theories 
of subsidiary delegation in administrative law, which focus on promot-
ing rule of law virtues by constraining the decisionmaking institution.
16
)  
Why might courts apply a nondelegation norm in immigration 
cases? Do those cases implicate the kinds of choices that courts might 
                                                                                                                           
the Naturalization Clause. See, for example, Fong Yue Ting, 149 US at 712–13; The Chinese Ex-
clusion Case, 130 US at 604. 
 13 See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U Chi 
L Rev 1721, 1722 (2002). 
 14 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U Chi L Rev 315, 316 (2000). 
 15 Id at 317. 
 16 On issues of subsidiary delegation, see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poul-
try at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 Yale L J 1399 
(2000). For a discussion of the relationship between institution-constraining rules and institution-
selecting rules in a different context, see Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions, 5 
Election L J 412, 413–18 (2006). 
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conclude should be made by Congress rather than administrative ac-
tors? To answer this question, it is helpful to recognize that one of 
Sunstein’s nondelegation canons makes an occasional appearance in 
immigration jurisprudence: the rule of lenity.
17
 For more than half a 
century, courts have periodically invoked the rule of lenity in immigra-
tion cases.
18
 As in the criminal context (where the rule of lenity is 
more frequently invoked), courts wield this canon of statutory con-
struction in immigration cases to interpret ambiguities against harsher 
punishment—which means against deportation or exclusion, and in 
favor of the noncitizen. The effect is to restrict delegation by denying 
deference to contrary agency interpretations of immigration provi-
sions. If Congress wants the provisions to be interpreted against non-
citizens, it must make that policy choice itself; the decision cannot be 
left to an administrative agency. 
                                                                                                                          
The canon itself, however, cannot be the reason for judicial skep-
ticism in immigration cases. The immigration rule of lenity, like its 
counterpart in the criminal arena, is almost inevitably invoked only in 
the breach by federal courts. Moreover, while the rule of lenity does 
reflect concern about the harshness of deportation, this antipenal sen-
timent is certainly not unique to immigration law. Thus, the sentiment 
does not fully explain whether there is something distinctive about 
immigration law qua immigration law that would support a nondele-
gation norm in this arena. 
Still, the rule of lenity is helpful in highlighting the possibility that 
there might be some aspect of immigration cases that implicates the 
kind of choices courts could want to reserve to Congress. Is there such 
a feature that might justify invoking the democracy-reinforcing rubric 
of nondelegation? Perhaps the most plausible candidate would be the 
claim that immigration decisions are distinctive because they concern 
the allocation of the primary good of membership within a democracy. 
 
 17 In addition to the rule of lenity, the canon of constitutional avoidance—another of Sun-
stein’s nondelegation canons—is sometimes invoked in immigration cases. See Sunstein, 67 U 
Chi L Rev at 316 (cited in note 14). That canon instructs courts to, whenever possible, avoid 
interpreting a statute in a manner that would raise serious questions about the statute’s constitu-
tionality. Accordingly, courts applying the canon would refuse to defer to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute that raises constitutional questions—even if that interpretation would ordinarily 
receive Chevron deference. In this fashion, the canon operates as a nondelegation mechanism. 
For a discussion of the long history of courts applying the constitutional avoidance canon in the 
immigration arena, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L J 545, 560–73 (1990). 
 18 See, for example, Bonetti v Rogers, 356 US 691, 699 (1958) (“When Congress leaves to 
the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be re-
solved in favor of lenity.”); Fong Haw Tan v Phelan, 333 US 6, 10 (1948); Delgadillo v Carmichael, 
332 US 388, 391 (1947). For perhaps the earliest hint of the lenity idea in immigration jurispru-
dence, see Yamataya v Fisher, 189 US 86, 99–101 (1903). 
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Courts might conclude that an institution with a stronger democratic 
pedigree than the Board of Immigration Appeals should make those 
membership-allocation decisions. Immigration decisions—decisions to 
admit or deport immigrants—often implicate membership in the po-
litical and constitutional community in at least two different ways. 
First, each particular decision by the Board resolves the membership 
status of an individual noncitizen by determining whether the nonciti-
zen’s conduct should or should not make her deportable, excludable, 
or so forth. Second, the Board’s decisions in the aggregate allocate 
membership across cases by interpreting the asylum requirements, the 
criminal deportation provisions, and so on to elaborate a set of rules 
that regulate the extension and deprivation of various forms of mem-
bership to existing and potential immigrants. This feature of immigra-
tion policy has led political theorists like Michael Walzer to argue that 
such decisions are among the most important we make: “The primary 
good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human 
community. And what we do with regard to membership structures all 
our other distributive choices.”
19
 
On this account, judicial skepticism in immigration cases is partly 
about democracy and delegation—or, more specifically, about the kind 
of democratic processes the courts demand be used to make some set 
of sensitive membership judgments involving immigration.
20
 
To be sure, there are a few problems with this interpretation of 
the case law. The first is conceptual. The idea of “membership” is a bit 
slippery; a quick survey of the vast literature on citizenship confirms 
this much.
21
 For that reason, it might be difficult to define the bounda-
ries of a principle that prefers Congress to make interpretive decisions 
that affect the distribution of “membership” in the national political 
community. Some might claim that other sorts of decisions—say, gov-
ernment decisions that allocate educational benefits, or welfare bene-
fits, or access to health care—also implicate “membership” in a sense 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 31 (Basic Books 
1983). 
 20 While I have focused above on the distribution of authority between Congress and the 
executive branch immigration agencies, this democracy-reinforcing account could, of course, also 
focus on the distribution of immigration authority within the executive branch. See generally 
Elena Kagan and David J. Barron, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup Ct Rev 201. One 
might complain, for example, that the immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
do not deserve deference because they lack the democratic pedigree of, say, the Attorney Gen-
eral or perhaps the President. The Supreme Court suggested such an intra-executive branch 
nondelegation principle in Hampton v Mow Sun Wong, 426 US 88, 101–05 (1976). 
 21 See generally, for example, Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Con-
temporary Membership (Princeton 2006); Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for 
Inclusion (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values) (Harvard 1991); James H. Kettner, The De-
velopment of American Citizenship, 1608–1870 (North Carolina 1978). 
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sufficient to require congressional rather than agency decisionmaking. 
One could try to avoid this difficulty by acknowledging that the theory 
picking out immigration decisions is partial (in the sense that it may 
not reach all decisions that bear importantly on membership). But 
that would not fully resolve the conceptual issues because circum-
scribing the boundaries of what constitutes an “immigration” decision 
is itself somewhat tricky. 
In addition to this conceptual difficulty, there is a more serious 
problem. Even if there is consensus that, for example, the distribution 
of membership is implicated by the basic decision about what conduct 
should make a noncitizen deportable, one would still have to justify 
the conclusion that Congress should not be permitted to delegate 
these decisions to administrative agencies.
22
 This presents a tough 
problem of democratic and constitutional theory. But it is a problem 
more generally with existing discussions of nondelegation canons. 
They provide an interpretive account of why the judiciary might re-
quire Congress to make certain decisions, but they generally do not 
develop a thoroughgoing defense of courts’ decision to prefer Con-
gress. For example, while the nondelegation idea is an intuitively at-
tractive account of the canon of constitutional avoidance, more work 
would need to be done to justify fully the conclusion that constitu-
tionally sensitive issues must be decided by Congress rather than ad-
ministrative agencies ultimately accountable to the President. In this 
short Essay, however, my ambition is more modest. I want simply to 
suggest that the nondelegation idea might, as a descriptive matter, 
                                                                                                                           
 22 There is an additional complication here: one would also have to sort out the question 
whether the power is Congress’s to delegate in the first place. As I explained above, the Constitu-
tion itself does not contain much guidance about how immigration lawmaking authority is dis-
tributed within the political branches. Scholars have sometimes suggested that the immigration 
power is clearly derived exclusively from Article I, § 8, which gives Congress the power to regu-
late naturalization. See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From 
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum L Rev 2097, 2178 (2004). But the Supreme 
Court has never clearly specified the source of immigration power, and has on occasion sug-
gested that the executive might have independent constitutional authority over immigration 
policy. See, for example, Knauff v Shaughnessy, 338 US 537, 542 (1950): 
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not 
alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign 
affairs of the nation. When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of 
aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an inherent execu-
tive power. 
To the extent that the executive is vested with an independent source of power over immigra-
tion, it becomes less clear how one should think about issues of delegation and nondelegation in 
the immigration arena.  
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provide an attractive reinterpretation of the surprising absence of ad-
ministrative deference in many immigration cases.
23
 
If nondelegation norms are at work, there remains one final diffi-
culty. Nondelegation principles are designed to promote congressional 
decisionmaking, not to liberate judicial decisionmaking. A fairly com-
mon approach to constraining such decisionmaking in individual cases 
is for judges implementing a nondelegation norm to agree upon an 
interpretive default that they enforce in the absence of a clear deci-
sion by Congress. In constitutional avoidance cases, the interpretive 
default is the reading that does not raise constitutional questions. In 
rule of lenity cases, the interpretive default is the reading that narrows 
(rather than expands) the scope of criminal liability. In immigration 
cases, courts could similarly adopt an interpretive default. The rule of 
lenity’s history in immigration jurisprudence might suggest one: reading 
statutes to protect the existing membership status of a noncitizen, ab-
sent a clear decision by Congress to strip the noncitizen of her status. 
That is not to say, of course, that such a default is a necessary cor-
ollary to an immigration nondelegation norm. Judges could also en-
force the norm by employing ordinary tools of statutory interpreta-
tion. And in fact, that approach is more consistent with the actual 
practice of immigration review by federal courts. Posner and other 
judges do not typically construe ambiguity in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act in favor of noncitizens when they refuse to defer to 
the immigration courts. Instead, they make their own judgment about 
the meaning of the relevant statute.
24
 While this second approach 
might appear to shift some measure of interpretive authority from 
agencies to judges, rather than to Congress, the appearance is some-
what misleading. Judges inevitably must play some role in order to 
enforce a nondelegation norm. When judges implement the norm by 
employing an interpretive default, that role is perhaps obscured. But it 
is judges, of course, who establish the interpretive default—as well as 
decide when to invoke it. That ordinary statutory interpretation leaves 
                                                                                                                           
 23 This theory might also help explain why, as Hiroshi Motomura has documented, the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance has so often been applied in immigration cases where the 
constitutional concerns are weak or nonexistent. See Motomura, 100 Yale L J at 545 (cited in 
note 17). The aggressive application of the constitutional avoidance doctrine might simply be an 
artifact of courts trying to shoehorn their delegation concerns about membership decisions into 
an existing doctrine that operates to prevent delegation. 
 24 Mei v Ashcroft, 393 F3d 737 (7th Cir 2004), provides a good example. In that case Posner 
concluded that it would be meaningless to defer to the immigration court’s interpretation of the 
deportation provision covering “crime[s] involving moral turpitude,” but still interpreted the 
ambiguous provision to cover Mei’s conviction. Id at 739. Rather than construing the provision 
narrowly and forcing Congress to make the decision about whether the provision reached as far 
as the immigration court had concluded, he resolved the ambiguity about the outer limits of the 
provision’s coverage himself. See id at 740–42.  
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some room for judgment, therefore, does not undermine the possibil-
ity that such an interpretive exercise is part of a nondelegation-
inspired exercise by a court. 
In short, judicial skepticism of agency action in modern immigra-
tion cases may be in part about the distribution of power between 
Congress and the executive, a separation of powers problem long 
overlooked by immigration jurisprudence and scholarship. 
II.  AGENCY INCOMPETENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Nondelegation norms may not be the only explanation for judi-
cial skepticism of the immigration agencies. In recent cases, Posner’s 
(and other judges’) skepticism appears to stem at least in part from 
dissatisfaction with the decisionmaking process within the agency. In 
such cases, Posner does not directly challenge administrative law’s 
conventional wisdom that an agency with primary responsibility for 
implementing a statute should receive substantial deference from fed-
eral courts when it discharges that responsibility. Instead, he concludes 
that deference is not due because the immigration agencies are failing 
to discharge this duty when they decide immigration cases. On this 
account, therefore, the exceptional treatment of immigration cases con-
cerns the distribution of interpretive authority between the judiciary 
and the executive, rather than between the executive and Congress.
25
 
In recent years, Posner has more and more frequently concluded 
that both the immigration judges who conduct deportation proceed-
ings and the Board of Immigration Appeals that reviews decisions of 
the immigration judges are inept. Time and time again he has com-
plained that “the adjudication of [immigration] cases at the adminis-
trative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”
26
 
Among other rebukes, he has labeled the immigration courts’ deci-
                                                                                                                           
 25 Moreover, it is clear that one cannot fit this apparent lack of deference into standard 
administrative law doctrines. As I noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’s interpretations of immigration statutes are due Chevron deference. See 
INS v Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 US 415, 425 (1999). Even putting aside this holding, the immigration 
courts’ interpretations seem to qualify for deference under most conventional accounts of United 
States v Mead, 533 US 218 (2001)—accounts that focus on whether an agency interpretation 
carries the “force of law” (the immigration courts’ interpretations clearly do), as well as accounts 
that emphasize procedural formality. 
 26 Benslimane v Gonzales, 430 F3d 828, 830 (7th Cir 2005). See also Pasha v Gonzales, 433 
F3d 530, 531 (7th Cir 2005) (“At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we reiterate our oft-
expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the Immigration Court and the 
Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . The performance of these federal agencies is too often in-
adequate. This case presents another depressing example.”). 
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sions arbitrary,
27
 unreasoned,
28
 irrational,
29
 inconsistent,
30
 and unin-
formed.
31
 
Posner’s concerns about competence extend to the immigration 
agencies’ handling of both factual and legal questions. He has fre-
quently found that immigration judges are uninformed about the fac-
tual questions they are charged with resolving or, even worse, that 
they ignore available evidence and base factual findings on bald asser-
tions. With respect to questions of law, Posner has reached similar con-
clusions. Consider his evaluation of the immigration courts in Mei v 
Ashcroft.
32
 The case concerned whether the petitioner was deportable 
for having committed a “crime involving moral turpitude.” The 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See, for example, Benslimane, 430 F3d at 832 (chastising the immigration judge for “arbi-
trarily denying a motion for a continuance”). 
 28 See, for example, Hor v Gonzales, 421 F3d 497, 500 (7th Cir 2005) (“In short, there is no 
reasoned basis for the immigration judge’s conclusion, which was based . . . [on] unsubstantiated 
conjectures.”); Joshi v Ashcroft, 389 F3d 732, 736–37 (7th Cir 2004) (“A decision that resolves a 
critical factual question without mention of the principal evidence cannot be considered ade-
quately reasoned.”); Mamedov v Ashcroft, 387 F3d 918, 919 (7th Cir 2004) (“As in a number of 
recent [immigration] cases, the opinion by the immigration judge . . . is unreasoned.”); Lian v 
Ashcroft, 379 F3d 457, 461–62 (7th Cir 2004) (“The immigration judge failed to give the issue a 
responsible analysis. That is to put it mildly. Lian’s counsel presented a huge mass of evidence 
bearing on the only issue in the case. . . . All this material (and more) was, so far as we can deter-
mine, completely ignored by the immigration judge.”). 
 29 See, for example, Hor, 421 F3d at 501 (“To be entitled to deference, [an immigration 
judge’s] determination . . . must rest on more than [an] implausible assertion backed up by no 
facts.”); Iao v Gonzales, 400 F3d 530, 533 (7th Cir 2005) (“The immigration judge’s opinion 
cannot be regarded as reasoned; and there was no opinion by the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. . . . [The petitioner] is entitled to a rational analysis of the evidence by them.”); Mengistu v 
Ashcroft, 355 F3d 1044, 1047 (7th Cir 2004) (“[A]s we tirelessly repeat, . . . an agency opinion that 
fails to build a rational bridge between the record and the agency’s legal conclusion cannot 
survive judicial review.”); Galina v INS, 213 F3d 955, 958 (7th Cir 2000) (“The Board’s analysis 
was woefully inadequate, indicating that it has not taken to heart previous judicial criticisms of 
its performance in asylum cases. . . . The elementary principles of administrative law, the rules of 
logic, and common sense seem to have eluded the Board in this as in other cases.”). 
 30 See, for example, Djouma v Gonzales, 429 F3d 685, 687–88 (7th Cir 2005) (criticizing the 
ad hoc way in which immigration judges determine the credibility of asylum applicants, and 
taking the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice to task for “fail[ing] 
to provide the immigration judges and the members of the Board of Immigration Appeals with 
any systematic guidance on the resolution of credibility issues in these cases”). 
 31 See, for example, id at 688 (“The [immigration agencies] seem committed to case by case 
adjudication in circumstances in which a lack of background knowledge denies the adjudicators 
the cultural competence required to make reliable determinations of credibility.”); Hor, 421 F3d 
at 500 (criticizing immigration judges deciding asylum cases for being woefully uninformed 
about the conditions in the countries where the asylum claims arose); Iao, 400 F3d at 533–34 
(claiming that “[a] lack of familiarity with relevant foreign cultures” was a “disturbing feature” of 
this case, as well as of many other immigration cases); Lian, 379 F3d at 459 (criticizing immigra-
tion judges for not being knowledgeable about foreign countries whose practices and laws are 
relevant to the judges’ determinations); Comollari v Ashcroft, 378 F3d 694, 696 (7th Cir 2004) 
(criticizing an immigration judge in an asylum case for getting wrong the basic—and disposi-
tive—fact of which government was in power in Albania in 1999).  
 32 393 F3d 737 (7th Cir 2004). 
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threshold question was whether the Board of Immigration Appeals’s 
interpretation of this statutory term was due Chevron deference. 
Judge Posner concluded that it would be meaningless to give defer-
ence to the Board:  
Since Congress did not define “crime involving moral turpitude” 
when it inserted the term in the immigration statute, . . . it is rea-
sonable to suppose à la Chevron that Congress contemplated 
that the agency charged with administering the statute would de-
fine the term, and specifically would tailor the definition to the 
policies embodied in the immigration statutes. The Board of Im-
migration Appeals has done neither. . . . It is not deploying any 
insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating immigra-
tion cases.
33
 
Moreover, Posner’s concerns extend beyond issues of compe-
tence; he has often also questioned the immigration courts’ impartial-
ity. In asylum cases, for example, Posner has hinted that immigration 
judges are unfairly predisposed against the asylum seekers whose peti-
tions they are adjudicating.
34
 He has suggested the same with respect 
to criminal deportation cases. Many criminal deportation cases con-
cern the question whether a noncitizen is deportable for having been 
convicted of an “aggravated felony”—a statutory term of art under 
the immigration laws.
35
 As with other statutory terms in the immigra-
tion statute, Posner has often rejected rather than deferred to the gov-
ernment’s interpretation of the “aggravated felony” provision. A con-
cern about bias seems to animate this lack of deference; in one recent 
case, for example, he lamented that “[t]he only consistency that we can 
see in the government’s treatment of the meaning of ‘aggravated fel-
ony’ is that the alien always loses.”
36
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 33 Id at 739. See also Sahi v Gonzales, 416 F3d 587, 588 (7th Cir 2005) (“The primary re-
sponsibility for defining key terms in the immigration statute that the statutes themselves do not 
define . . . is that of the Board of Immigration Appeals as the Attorney General’s delegate. The 
Board has failed to discharge that responsibility.”). 
 34 See, for example, Pramatarov v Gonzales, 454 F3d 764, 766 (7th Cir 2006) (noting that the 
immigration judge’s questioning of the asylum seeker “was so harsh and rude as to suggest bias”).  
 35 See 8 USC §§ 1101(a)(43), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). 
 36 Gonzales-Gomez v Achim, 441 F3d 532, 535 (7th Cir 2006). Judge Posner’s apparent 
concern that the immigration courts in Gonzales-Gomez were acting partially—almost like 
prosecutors rather than adjudicators—suggests a parallel to another context in which courts do 
not afford Chevron deference: federal criminal prosecutions. Courts have never deferred to 
interpretations of federal criminal law adopted by the Attorney General or her subordinate 
United States Attorneys who are charged with enforcing federal criminal law. See generally Dan 
M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv L Rev 469 (1996) (arguing in 
favor of deference in the federal criminal law context). There are some oft-overlooked similari-
ties between immigration law and federal criminal law—regulatory areas that both involve large 
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In short, across a broad spectrum of immigration cases, Judge 
Posner has repeatedly suggested that there is something exceptional 
(but not exceptionally good) about the immigration agencies and how 
they resolve immigration cases. To be sure, Posner is not the only fed-
eral judge to reach this conclusion. For some time, a number of federal 
appellate judges have suggested that the immigration courts are fun-
damentally incompetent, biased, or both. And this chorus has grown 
louder in recent years, as a variety of “streamlining” procedures de-
signed to expedite the processing of immigration cases has further 
eroded the ability of immigration judges and the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals to devote sufficient resources to individual cases.
37
 
On this account, Judge Posner’s skepticism in immigration cases 
appears to be driven by a judgment about comparative institutional 
competence. Such judgments are, of course, central to debates about 
deference in administrative law.
38
 For example, Chevron deference is 
often defended on the ground that administrative agencies have 
greater expertise and more democratic accountability than courts. But 
administrative law jurisprudence has generally made these judgments 
of institutional competence wholesale rather than retail. In fact, that 
was part of the point of Chevron—to create a general, trans-
substantive doctrine of administrative deference to replace the more 
ad hoc approach to deference that had previously characterized ad-
ministrative law jurisprudence. That is not to say that the post-
Chevron world is one with uniform deference to all forms of adminis-
trative decisionmaking. Far from it.
39
 But the doctrine does not gener-
ally authorize courts to decide whether deference is appropriate by 
evaluating directly the competence of the administrative decision-
                                                                                                                           
enforcement agencies. Perhaps these similarities help explain Posner’s concern about the impar-
tiality of the immigration agencies. 
 37 See generally Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals’s Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 Stan L & Policy Rev 481, 
499–501 (2005) (summarizing the limitations placed on the Board of Immigration Appeals by 
recent streamlining procedures); John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cro-
nin, Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal 
Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 Georgetown Immig 
L J 1, 29–32 (2005) (discussing the criticisms of the streamlining procedures adopted since Octo-
ber 1999); Letter from Richard A. Posner to Senator Richard J. Durbin (Mar 15, 2006) (conclud-
ing that “[t]he Board’s problem is that it is overwhelmed by appeals and thus cannot do an effec-
tive filtering job”). 
 38 More generally, issues of comparative competence are central to questions about the 
distribution of interpretive authority among different institutional actors in our constitutional 
system. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of 
Legal Interpretation (Harvard 2006). 
 39 See generally Mead, 533 US 218 (holding that Chevron deference applies only when 
Congress intended the agency’s interpretations to carry the force of law); Thomas W. Merrill and 
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Georgetown L J 833 (2001) (discussing the types of 
agency interpretations to which Chevron deference does not or should not apply). 
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makers whose rulings are being reviewed.
40
 This, however, is precisely 
what Judge Posner appears to be doing in his immigration jurispru-
dence. And it is this that makes his lack of deference to the legal and 
factual determinations of the immigration courts so striking. 
If this descriptive account is correct, what should we make of it? 
We might question whether federal courts are really in a position to 
make the judgment about agency competence that Judge Posner has 
made about the immigration courts. But perhaps the federal courts, 
which each year review more than ten thousand immigration court 
decisions,
41
 are uniquely well positioned to make that determination. 
In any event, if we assume that Posner has accurately concluded that 
the immigration courts are incompetent, an important question re-
mains: should a federal appellate judge respond to the incompetence 
of the immigration courts by refusing to give deference to the agency’s 
factual and legal judgments—in other words, by creating a de facto 
doctrine of administrative law exceptionalism for immigration law? 
Posner never directly considers this question in his immigration 
jurisprudence. But while he implicitly answers it in the affirmative, 
several complicating factors make it quite difficult to identify the best 
judicial response. On the side of Posner’s immigration administrative 
exceptionalism is one obviously important interest—the interest of 
the individual noncitizens whose cases he reviews. After all, without 
his skeptical review a number of people would likely have been 
wrongly deported without a minimally acceptable adjudication of 
their claims and, in several cases, in fairly clear contravention to the 
requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
Nonetheless, Posner is but one federal judge. However Herculean 
his talents might be, he cannot personally decide more than a small 
fraction of the immigration cases in the Seventh Circuit. And, of 
course, he cannot decide any of the far greater numbers of immigra-
tion cases that flow through the federal circuits with far larger immi-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Note that, in one sense, Judge Posner’s approach is somewhat more categorical than the 
approach suggested by Mead. There the Court appears to contemplate adjusting deference on a 
policy-by-policy basis to reflect the nuances of Congress’s delegation decision. Here Judge Pos-
ner appears to make a rough judgment about the institutional competence of an entire adminis-
trative institution—the immigration courts—and then use that judgment to calibrate his level of 
deference in all cases coming from that institution. 
 41 See Recent Case: Third and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration 
Courts, 119 Harv L Rev 2596, 2596 (2006) (noting that immigration appeals have “swollen in the 
past five years from three percent to eighteen percent of all federal appeals”). See also Palmer, 
Yale-Loehr, and Cronin, 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 44–45 (cited in note 37) (discussing 
monthly rates of filings). 
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gration dockets.
42
 This highlights one potential problem—a coordina-
tion problem—with Posner’s immigration exceptionalism. 
As Adrian Vermeule and others have noted, the judiciary is a 
“they,” not an “it.”
43
 For that reason, Posner’s skeptical review of im-
migration agencies can only advance the interest of large numbers of 
potential deportees if a sufficient number of federal judges adopt a 
similar review strategy. Ordinarily, of course, federal judges coordinate 
to a certain extent through the system of judicial precedent and over-
sight by the Supreme Court. But these usual means of coordination 
are much less likely to work here than in some other contexts. As I 
noted above, there is no ready doctrinal toehold in administrative law 
jurisprudence for Posner’s direct assessment of the immigration 
courts’ competence. Accordingly, his skeptical standard of review 
stands outside the ordinary doctrinal framework for reviewing admin-
istrative decisions. And because it exists outside this framework, it is 
more difficult for other federal courts to coordinate around it in the 
way that they do around precedent. Perhaps even more important, its 
extradoctrinal status makes it very unlikely to be adopted anytime 
soon by the Supreme Court. 
Putting aside the coordination issue, there is a more general diffi-
culty with the immigration exceptionalism approach: it is not clear 
whether, in the long run, it is better for deportees specifically or the 
immigration adjudication system generally for federal courts to en-
gage in skeptical, intensive review of the immigration courts.
44
 If the 
administrative adjudication system is failing, there are at least three 
ways to correct for its failures. The first is for federal courts to step 
into the breach, as Posner has done. But it is unclear whether this is a 
sustainable strategy—or whether it can ever be more than a margin-
ally effective one—given the huge volume of immigration adjudica-
tion and the limited capacities of the federal judiciary.
45
 
                                                                                                                           
 42 The Second and Ninth Circuits have by far the largest immigration dockets. These cir-
cuits each decide more than twice the number of cases decided by the average circuit. See 
Palmer, Yale-Loehr, and Cronin, 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 44–45 (cited in note 37).  
 43 See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory 
and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 549 (2005).  
 44 This possibility is a specific example of a more general concern about the role of courts 
in promoting social and institutional change. For a discussion of the more general concern, see, 
for example, Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 
(Chicago 1993). 
 45 This strategy is also limited by the fact that many noncitizens in immigration proceed-
ings have difficulty seeking review of agency rulings—some because they are prohibited from 
doing so by limitations on judicial review in the immigration code, some because they are unable 
to pay the filing fees associated with judicial review, and some because they would have to re-
main in detention for a long period of time in order to pursue their claims in federal court. 
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A second possibility is to persuade or coerce the immigration 
agencies to improve their administrative adjudication system. Posner 
has often in his opinions pressed the Attorney General to do just this. 
Among others, he has pleaded for two particular improvements. 
Sometimes he has suggested that the proper way for the Attorney 
General to discharge his duty to interpret the immigration statute 
would be to promulgate more rules defining the statute’s key terms to 
provide more guidance to immigration judges and the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals.
46
 At other times, Judge Posner has suggested changes 
to the specificity of the policymaking action rather than its form: he 
has begged the Board to lay down more rules—or at least more spe-
cific standards—to guide its own process of adjudication.
47
 
These reforms might go some distance towards improving the ad-
judication of immigration cases in the administrative system. Neither 
would necessarily get at Posner’s concerns about bias, but both might 
alleviate some of his rule of law and arbitrariness concerns.
48
 This said, 
it is unclear whether Posner’s intensive oversight makes it more or less 
likely that the agency will reform its adjudicatory process. His over-
sight might spur the agency by raising the cost of shoddy administra-
tive adjudication. The immigration courts often must spend additional 
resources to revisit decisions that have been overturned by appellate 
courts, and the appellate court opinions themselves can be quite embar-
rassing to the agency (as many of Judge Posner’s are). These costs might 
have disciplining effects.
49
 On the other hand, the immigration agencies 
might have less of an incentive to improve their adjudicatory processes 
if greater oversight by Article III courts enables the agencies essentially 
to outsource some of their adjudicatory effort. Some have suggested 
that the Attorney General’s “streamlining” regulations for the Board of 
                                                                                                                           
 46 I leave to one side the question whether administrative law jurisprudence smiles or 
frowns on judicial attempts to push administrative decisionmaking into a particular procedural 
form—in this case the rulemaking process rather than agency adjudication.  
 47 See, for example, Djouma, 429 F3d at 687–88; Sahi, 416 F3d at 588–89; Mei, 393 F3d at 739. 
 48 These are, of course, concerns that have long animated the delegation debate in adminis-
trative law more generally. This highlights the way in which the two theories of Posner’s immigra-
tion skepticism—the nondelegation theory and the immigration court incompetence theory—
track two threads of this delegation debate. One thread has focused on preventing certain dele-
gations from Congress to the executive (and this thread is typically given the “nondelegation” 
label), while the second thread has focused on promoting internal controls on delegation. See 
note 16 and accompanying text.  
 49 Of course, the remand required by SEC v Chenery Corp, 318 US 80 (1943), when a 
federal court invalidates an agency decision can cause delay and duplication of effort that is 
costly for the noncitizen in deportation proceedings as well as for the immigration courts. 
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Immigration Appeals have done just this, reducing the adjudicatory 
burden on the agency by shifting that effort to federal courts.
50
  
The third way to correct for the perceived failing of the immigra-
tion courts is to persuade Congress to overhaul the structure of immi-
gration adjudication.
51
 Here too, intensive oversight by federal courts 
might either advance or retard such reform efforts. Federal court 
judges might act as whistleblowers, providing valuable information to 
Congress about agency incompetence. This information might be con-
sumed directly by congressional oversight committees (particularly 
when the judicial criticism comes from a prominent judge like Posner). 
Or it might be used by immigrants’ rights advocates to bolster the 
credibility of their arguments to these oversight bodies. Still, intensive 
oversight by federal courts might also alleviate the perceived need for 
administrative reform. If federal courts are dedicating additional re-
sources to police the immigration courts, Congress might conclude 
that it is not worth investing its own energy to restructure that system 
of adjudication. Moreover, efforts to encourage internal reform by the 
agency and external reform by Congress might work at cross-
purposes. If the efforts prompt agency reform that improves the adju-
dicative process at the margins, the marginal improvement might 
make it less likely that Congress will jump in and undertake more 
wide-ranging reforms. 
Sometimes, however, it might be possible for a federal judge to 
pursue all three of the above strategies simultaneously. In fact, it may 
be that Judge Posner’s scathing immigration jurisprudence has man-
aged to do just this—to correct egregious errors in individual cases 
(perhaps even setting off a cascade among other judges, who will 
themselves step in and correct more errors); to embarrass the immi-
gration agencies to an extent that increases the likelihood of internal 
reform; and to signal Congress about significant problems in the cur-
rent system. Such a feat might not be possible in all situations or for 
all judges, and for that reason it will not always be clear what a well-
intentioned judge should do when confronted with an incompetent or 
biased agency decisionmaking structure. But Judge Posner’s conspicu-
ous skepticism in immigration cases illustrates a role that the federal 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See, for example, Palmer, Yale-Loehr, and Cronin, 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 31 (cited 
in note 37). 
 51 Over the past several decades, there have been recurring calls for Congress to establish 
an Article I immigration court much like the bankruptcy court system. See Peter J. Levinson, A 
Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 Notre Dame L Rev 644, 644–45 
(1980). Legislation to create such a court has been introduced in Congress several times. See, for 
example, HR 3187, 99th Cong, 1st Sess (Aug 1, 1985); Immigration Court, 104th Cong, 2d Sess 
(Sept 28, 1996), in 142 Cong Rec E1806-01 (Sept 28, 1996). 
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judiciary might play in overseeing executive behavior—a role quite 
different than that captured by Chevron and its progeny.  
CONCLUSION 
Judge Posner’s striking skepticism of immigration courts might be 
grounded in two quite different sources: nondelegation norms on the one 
hand and institutional incompetence on the other. Drawing attention to 
these possibilities is crucial to understanding his jurisprudence. More im-
portantly, introducing these possibilities highlights more fundamental, 
and largely unaddressed, questions about the institutional relationship 
between Congress, the executive, and judiciary in the immigration arena. 
Often these questions have been obscured by immigration scholarship’s 
obsession with the plenary power doctrine and ideas of immigration law’s 
exceptionalism. My goal here has been to illuminate—and promote con-
versation about—these oft-overlooked questions. 
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